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Abstract
We introduce a “high probability” framework for repeated games with incomplete
information. In our non-equilibrium setting, players aim to guarantee a certain payoff
with high probability, rather than in expected value. We provide a high probability
counterpart of the classical result of Mertens and Zamir for the zero-sum repeated
games. Any payoff that can be guaranteed with high probability can be guaranteed in
expectation, but the reverse is not true. Hence, unlike the average payoff case where the
payoff guaranteed by each player is the negative of the payoff by the other player, the
two guaranteed payoffs would differ in the high probability framework. One motivation
for this framework comes from information transmission systems, where it is customary
to formulate problems in terms of asymptotically vanishing probability of error. An
application of our results to a class of compound arbitrarily varying channels is given.
1 Introduction
The standard game theory framework considers players who are von Neumann-Morgenstern
(vNM) utility maximizers; that is, they maximize the expected value of some“utility func-
tion” defined over potential outcomes. The key to finding equilibria in such framework, of
course, is to know the exact functional form of the utility function in order to translate
payoffs and probabilities to utilities. The complexity of the analysis under non-standard
functional forms, on the one hand, and the complications of identifying the functional forms
of the utilities of the real-world players, on the other hand, are two of the challenges of the
standard framework.1
In this paper, we undertake the above issues by introducing a non-equilibrium solution
concept. We develop an analytical framework for (zero-sum) repeated games to study
the following question: What is the highest payoff that players can “guarantee with high
probability?” More precisely, we are concerned with payoffs that can be guaranteed (with
1That is probably one reason for that risk-neutrality of the players is an standard assumption in many
games.
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Figure 1: (Top) payoff tables for Alice in state s ∈ {0, 1}. (Bottom) the average table.
some strategy) with probability 1− ǫ, where ǫ goes to 0 as the games get played more and
more. This “high probability game theory” setting helps us to derive results analogous to
the existing ones on repeated games with incomplete information by Mertens and Zamir
in [1].
Let us motivate our solution concept by a simple, concrete example. Consider the zero-
sum repeated game depicted in Fig. 1 between Alice and Bob. There is a state variable
S with uniform distribution over {0, 1}. Alice’s payoff table for s = 0 and s = 1 are
given (Bob’s payoff is negative of Alice’s payoff). We assume that Alice and Bob have no
knowledge of the value of S. The game is played n times between Alice and Bob, with the
state variable being drawn at the beginning and kept fixed throughout the n games. Alice
and Bob only get to see their payoff values after playing all the n games; hence they cannot
gain any information about S throughout the game. We make the assumption that if the
total sum of the n payoffs of the n games of a player is positive, that player wins the entire
game. There is a draw if the total sum of each player is zero.
Let us first assume that Alice aims to maximize the expected value of her average payoffs
in the n games. Since Alice and Bob do not know S, we can compute the average table
with weights pS(0) = pS(1) = 1/2 as given in the bottom of Fig. 1. The average table is
symmetric and a Nash equilibrium strategy is for players to choose their actions uniformly
at random. This gives Alice an expected average payoff of 1.5. Thus, Alice can guarantee
a positive total expected payoff in the Nash equilibrium of the repeated game. However,
with this strategy, Alice’s average payoff is negative with probability 1/2; it is −7/4 when
s = 0. Therefore, with probability 1/2 when s = 0, she will lose the entire n game as her
total sum payoff becomes negative with high probability by the law of large numbers. On
the other hand, assume that Alice plays a different strategy of choosing action R all the
time (which is not part of a Nash equilibrium). Then, Bob will play U and this leads to a
payoff of 1 for Alice regardless of whether s = 0 or s = 1. The payoff of 1 is smaller than
the average payoff of 1.5 that an equilibrium strategy will give her, but is guaranteed with
probability one; thus ensuring that Alice will win the entire game.
More generally, given an arbitrary repeated game (with complete or incomplete infor-
mation), we ask that given an ǫ > 0, whether Alice has a strategy, for a sufficiently large
enough n, that guarantees her total sum payoff to be greater than a number v with prob-
ability 1 − ǫ. In studying this natural problem, one may consider the whole n games as a
one stage strategic form game, and then consider the sequence of these games for different
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Figure 2: An erasure channel where the erasure variable Ei at time i is produced in a
repeated game
values of n, as n becomes larger and larger. However, we find it easier to analyze this game
as an extensive form repeated game in a high probability framework.
Motivation from information theory: One motivation for a high probability frame-
work comes from information theory, where repeated use of a channel and a vanishing
probability of error as the number of channel uses, n, tends to infinity is common. In the
following we explain this via a simple example that requires little background in information
theory.
We need some definitions: a binary erasure channel (BEC) is a communication medium
with a binary input X ∈ {0, 1}. The output of this channel, denoted by random variable Y ,
is a symbol from {0, 1, e} where e indicates that the input symbol is erased. When the input
symbol is not erased (Y 6= e), we have Y = X. The transmitter will not know whether a
transmission has been erased at the receiver or not.
Let us denote the erasure event by random variable E, i.e., E = 1 indicates that the
input bit is not erased. When we use the channel n times, we will have erasure random
variables E1, E2, · · · , En for each transmission. We assume that each Ei ∈ {0, 1} is a
function of three variables: an internal channel state variable S, an input Ai by Alice and
an input Bi by Bob, according to Ei = gS(Ai, Bi), where gs(a, b) is a given function for any
s ∈ S. Random variable S is randomly chosen at the beginning and is fixed through the n
channel uses (slow fading). Alice and Bob have initial partial knowledge about S by having
access to SA and SB that are correlated with S. Figure 2 illustrates this configuration. Alice
aims to help the transmission (trying to make Ei variables one, as much as possible) and
Bob aims to disrupt it. Neither Alice nor Bob observe the variables Ei. But we assume that
both Alice and Bob observe each other actions (inputs to the channel) causally; therefore,
if they know each other’s strategies, each party can infer some information about the other
party’s side information by observing their actions. Hence, there is a tradeoff for both
parties between using and hiding their side information: using it can be advantageous for
the current transmission while actions can reveal information to the other party which could
be turned against them in subsequent transmissions.
We can view the above as a game with incomplete information if we consider Ei to be
the payoff of the game for Alice (the payoff of Bob will be the negative of the payoff of
Alice). Now, suppose that Alice can guarantee the expected total payoff of n/2. It may be
the case that with probability 1/2, her total payoff is zero, and with probability 1/2 her
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total payoff is n. Then, with probability 1/2 all the transmitted bits will be erased and no
communication will be possible. Therefore, having a bound on the expected value of total
payoff is not useful. On the other hand, given some small ǫ > 0, assume that Alice can
guarantee her total payoff to be at least n/3 with probability 1− ǫ, regardless of how Bob
plays. In other words, with probability 1 − ǫ, at least n/3 bits from the n bits that the
transmitter sends will become available at the receiver. Then, with probability 1 − ǫ, the
transmitter can send about n/3 data bits by employing standard coding techniques such
as fountain codes. Therefore, a high probability framework is of relevance to information
transmission problem over this adversarial BEC channel.
It is possible to think of other information theory problems with a threshold phenomenon
where the high probability framework is of relevance. For instance, in coding theory, the
minimum distance of a code gives a guarantee that if the number of changes in a code
sequence is sufficiently small, decoding will be successful. One can consider a problem
where Alice and Bob are having actions that (along with a channel state) determines when
a transmission will become erroneous. It would be desirable for Alice to make sure that
the number of errors are bounded to ensure successful decoding. Or for instance, one can
imagine a control system with two players, one who is trying to increase the error and the
other who is trying to reduce the error. It may be that a bound on the total error of a
system be of importance (and not its expected value).
In Section 5, we provide a technical application of the high probability framework for
the problem of communication over a certain compound arbitrarily varying channel.
Our contribution: In this paper, we focus on repeated games with incomplete infor-
mation. Incomplete information refers to the fact that there are some unknown parameters
that affect the payoff of the players. Each player has its own partial knowledge of the pa-
rameters, which may leak to the other player through actions during the repeated game.
There is a tradeoff between hiding and using the information to each party. We refer the
reader to [2] for a comprehensive treatment. Our main contribution in this paper is to
find payoffs that can be guaranteed with high probability. We introduce a non-equilibrium
approach – the high probability condition – and characterize payoffs that can satisfy that
condition. Just like the average case framework, a complicating aspect of the problem is
the tradeoff between hiding and using the information in the high probability framework.
After proving our main result in the high probability framework, a non-trivial application
of this framework to compound arbitrarily varying channel is also given.
There have been few previous works on implicit flow of information through actions in
information theory [3, 4]. However, none of existing works address implicit communication
from the perspective of game theory to characterize the tradeoff between hiding and using
the information. Therefore, there are new conceptual features in our treatment.
Related work: The literature of repeated game theory contains several ideas that are
related to our paper. The standard approach to infinitely repeated games with no discount
rate is the closest to ours, but it is concerned with the average payoff as a criteria of equi-
librium [5]. As we discussed before, our paper in some sense provides a high probability
analogous of [1]. Fudenberg and Levine [6] study a repeated game of imperfect monitoring
where they provide asymptotic bounds for the payoff of the player whose reputation (against
his opponent) is crucial in identifying the equilibrium. The robust mechanism design litera-
ture is also related to ours, in that the goal is to “guarantee” a payoff (in a maxmin sense),
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but with a focus on single period games – see, for instance, [7] and [8].
It should be pointed out that classical game theory has already found many applications
in information theory in scenarios where we have channels with unknown parameters, or
channels that can vary arbitrarily (adversarial channels). The payoff function is generally
either a mutual information (e.g., [9–13]) or a coding error probability (e.g., [14,15]). Other
than the problem of channels with uncertainty, game theory is vastly being used in other
problems of information theory such as adversarial sources, power allocation and spectrum
sharing.
Organization: The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 1.1 we define
our notation. In Section 2 we formally define the problem, in Section 3 we review a result
in repeated games with incomplete information in the expected value regime and finally in
Section 4 we prove our main result which is finding the highest value a party can guarantee
with high probability in repeated games with incomplete information. Section 5 includes
an application of the framework.
1.1 Notation
We use capital letters for random variables and small letters for their realizations. We use
[i] to denote the set {1, 2, . . . , i}. Then X[i] denotes X1,X2, . . . ,Xi. We use both subscript
and superscripts to denote indicies; e.g., Xj is rv X indexed by j, and Xji is rv X indexed
by i and j. Thus, X
[k]
[n] = {(Xji : i ∈ [n], j ∈ [k]}. For a function f , Cav f and Vex f
denote its lower concave envelope and upper convex envelope, respectively; e.g., Cav f is
the smallest concave function that lies above f . The support of a probability distribution
p over a finite set A is defined as Supp(p) = {a ∈ A : p(a) > 0}.
2 Definition and Problem Statement
We consider a two player zero–sum game with Alice and Bob as players. We are interested
in Alice’s payoffs; hence Alice is the maximizer and Bob is the minimizer.
Definition 1. We define the value of a strategic game Υ, V (Υ), as Alice’s payoff in a Nash
equilibrium; this value is the same for all Nash equilibriums since the game is zero–sum.
We use VA (Υ) and VB (Υ) to denote Alice’s and Bob’s payoffs in any Nash equilibrium
respectively. Hence, V (Υ) = VA (Υ) = −VB (Υ).
A standard zero–sum repeated game of incomplete information consists of the following
components [1]:
• A zero–sum two player game Γ called the stage game which is repeated n times. This
game is between two players, say Alice and Bob, with finite sets of permissible actions
A and B, respectively. For each state s ∈ S, we have a payoff table gs where gs(a, b)
denotes Alice’s payoff when Alice plays action a ∈ A and Bob plays action b ∈ B in
Γ.
• A probability distribution pS(s) on a finite set of states, S, from which the state of
the game is chosen by nature at random at the beginning of the game. Without loss
of generality, we may assume that pS(s) > 0 for all s, i.e., S = Supp(p).
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• This state is fixed throughout the n repetitions of Γ, but neither Alice, nor Bob know
the exact value of the state. Instead, Alice and Bob receive SA and SB as the side
information about S, respectively. We assume that SA and SB are functions of S, i.e.,
SA = TA(S) and SB = TB(S). This assumption is made without loss of generality,
as argued later. The alphabets of random variables SA and SB are denoted by SA
and SB , respectively.
• Each party plays actions in the repeated game based on the information they have
since the beginning of the game, i.e., their side informations SA and SB and the
history of the game A[i−1] and B[i−1] which are Alice’s and Bob’s actions up to stage
i respectively. Note that in stage k, Alice and Bob play Ak and Bk simultaneously;
here we have shown actions with capital letters to emphasize that they are random
variables since the two parties are allowed to employ random strategies, and the initial
state S is random.
• We assume that Alice and Bob just observe their actions, not the payoffs they have
received. When all n stages are finished, Alice receives the time average of the payoffs
of stage games, i.e.,
σn :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
gS(Ai, Bi). (1)
Note that σn is a random variable.
The repeated game with above components is shown by ΓTA,TBn (p), where p is the prior
distribution on state space S. With an abuse of notation, we alternatively write ΓTA,TBn (S)
where S the random variable with distribution p.
A few points should be made about the above definition. First, note that the assumption
that SA and SB are deterministic functions of S is not restrictive. In fact, in the general case
where SA and SB are allowed to be random functions of S, we can define a random variable
N where SA and SB are deterministic functions of S and N (functional representation
lemma [16, Appendix B]). Therefore, for the new repeated game with state Sˆ = (S,N) and
payoff tables gˆ(s,n) = gs side informations are of our desired form and also the resulting
payoffs do not change.
We can consider the strategic form for the above extensive form game and call it
ΓˆTA,TBn (S). In this strategic form game, each action of a player is a pure strategy of him
in the repeated game, i.e., a collection of deterministic functions determining what action
should be played at each stage given the observations up to that time. The payoff of this
game is the expected outcome of the repeated game defined as in (1) when S is generated
from distribution pS(s). This strategic form game is indeed zero–sum, hence has a mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium with value V
(
ΓˆTA,TBn (S)
)
. This could be defined rigorously as
follows:
Definition 2. The strategic form game ΓˆTA,TBn (S) is defined as a one stage zero–sum game
with action sets Aˆ for Alice and Bˆ for Bob where
Aˆ = {(f1, . . . , fn) | fi : A[i−1] × B[i−1] × SA → A, 1 ≤ i ≤ n}
Bˆ = {(g1, . . . , gn) | gi : A[i−1] × B[i−1] × SB → B, 1 ≤ i ≤ n}
(2)
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where fi(a[i−1], b[i−1], sA) determines which action Alice will play if the history of the game
is a[i−1], b[i−1] and she has the side information SA, and Bob’s strategies are similar. Given
a realization S = s, a unique deterministic sequence of actions is played by Alice and Bob,
denoted by a[n](s), b[n](s) where
ai(s) = fi(a[i−1](s), b[i−1](s),TA(s))
bi(s) = gi(a[i−1](s), b[i−1](s),TB(s)).
(3)
The payoff function of this game is defined as follows:
1
n
∑
s
pS(s)
n∑
i=1
gs(ai(s), bi(s)). (4)
As mentioned above, this is a finite zero–sum game, hence has a mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium. Any strategy of this form is a mixture of pure strategies defined above, called
a mixed strategy in the repeated game. However, since the repeated game Γn is with
perfect recall, i.e., each player remembers his own past actions, Kuhn’s theorem implies
that without loss of generality we may only consider behavioral strategies (see, [17], for
instance). A behavioral strategy is a collection of random functions assigning probabilities
to each action given the history of the game at each stage:
Definition 3. A behavioral strategy of Alice in the game Γn is a collection of random
functions where
α(ai|a[i−1], b[i−1], sA), (5)
is the probability that Alice chooses action ai when the history of the game is a[i−1], b[i−1]
and Alice’s side information is sA. Bob’s behavioral strategies are defined similarly via
β(bi|a[i−1], b[i−1], sB). The choices of Alice and Bob in different stages are assumed to be
conditionally independent given the past action history2, i.e., the probability distribution on
the outcome of the game is
p(s, a[n], b[n]) = pS(s)
n∏
i=1
α(ai|a[i−1], b[i−1],TA(s))β(bi|a[i−1], b[i−1],TB(s)). (6)
The set of Alice’s behavioral strategies in Γn is denoted by A˜n and Bob’s behavioral
strategies is denoted by B˜n.
The value of Γn is defined as the value of its strategic form. As a result of Kuhn’s
theorem, we have
V
(
ΓTA,TBn (S)
)
= max
α∈A˜n
min
β∈B˜n
E
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
gS(Ai, Bi)
]
= min
β∈B˜n
max
α∈A˜n
E
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
gS(Ai, Bi)
]
, (7)
where Ai and Bi are random variables denoting the actions of Alice and Bob.
2In other words, the players do not use private randomization to make further correlation in their actions
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Let σn =
1
n
∑n
i=1 gS(Ai, Bi). be the time average payoff of Alice. Then, equation (7)
implies that if Alice plays her equilibrium strategy, independent of Bob’s strategy, we have
E [σn] ≥ V
(
ΓTA,TBn (S)
)
, (8)
which shows that Alice can guarantee V
(
ΓTA,TBn (S)
)
in the average sense by playing an
equilibrium (behavioral) strategy. Conversely, from (7), if Bob plays his equilibrium strat-
egy, Alice can not guarantee more than the value of the game, i.e., E [σn] ≤ V
(
ΓTA,TBn (S)
)
.
Hence V
(
ΓTA,TBn (S)
)
is the maximum value Alice can guarantee in the expected value sense.
The asymptotic behavior of this value, i.e., limn→∞V
(
ΓTA,TBn (S)
)
is analyzed by Mertens
and Zamir in [1]. We will review a special case of this result in Section 3.
On the other hand, one might be interested in finding the value Alice can guarantee
with high probability instead of in average. There are two ways of defining this concept.
Definition 4. We say that Alice can strongly guarantee a value v if for all ǫ > 0, there
exists a natural number N such that for all n > N , Alice has a strategy α in ΓTA,TBn (pS) so
that for all strategies β of Bob in this game we have
P (σn < v) < ǫ. (9)
Definition 5. We say that Alice can weakly guarantee a value v if for all ǫ > 0, there
exists N such that for all n > N and for all strategy β for Bob in ΓTA,TBn (pS), there exists
a strategy α for Alice in this game such that
P (σn < v) < ǫ. (10)
Note that the difference between the above two definitions is that if Alice wants to
guarantee a payoff strongly, then she needs to have a universal strategy α independent
of Bob’s strategy. A universal strategy of Alice should work for all possible strategy of
Bob. On the other hand, when Alice wants to guarantee a value weakly, she can adapt her
strategy based on Bob’s strategy. Therefore, it is evident that if Alice can guarantee a value
in the strong sense, she can guarantee it in the weak sense too.
Definition 6. When the game state has distribution pS, Alice’s and Bob’s side information
functions are TA and TB, respectively, we denote the supremum of all values Alice can
strongly guarantee as vs
sup
(pS ,TA,TB). Similarly v
w
sup
(pS ,TA,TB) denotes the supremum
over all values Alice can guarantee weakly. When it is clear from the context, we use vs
sup
and vw
sup
instead as shorthands for vw
sup
(pS ,TA,TB) and v
s
sup
(pS ,TA,TB), respectively.
We will find the values of vssup and v
w
sup in Section 4.
3 Review of results for the expected value payoff regime
In this section, we review an existing result for guaranteeing payoffs in the expected value. In
this approach, the Nash Equilibrium of the n stage game, V (Γn) is asymptotically analyzed
and its limit value as well as its convergence rate is obtained.
We first need a definition:
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Definition 7. Given a distribution pS on set S and payoff tables gs(a, b) for s ∈ S, define
u(pS) as the value of the one-stage zero-sum game with the average payoff table
∑
s pS(s)gs.
We may also denote it by u(S) where S is the random variable with distribution pS.
Consider the special case where one player is fully aware of the game state and the other
has no side information. In order to do so we employ the notation ∅ as the function which
gives no side information, i.e., it has a constant output ∅(s) = 0 for all s ∈ S. On the other
hand, let 1 is the side information function which gives full information, i.e., 1(s) = s for
all s ∈ S. We consider the case where TA = ∅,TB = 1. Then,
Theorem 1 (Theorem 3.16 in [18]). limn→∞V
(
Γ∅,1n (pS)
)
exists and is equal to Vex u(pS)
where Vex u is the convex hull of u as a function on the probability simplex. Furthermore
there exists a constant C such that for all pS we have
0 ≤ Vex u(pS)− V
(
Γ∅,1n (pS)
)
≤ C√
n
. (11)
Remark 1. In [18], Alice is assumed to have full information and Bob knows nothing; in
fact their place is reversed. In order to change their place, we can negate the payoff table.
That is why we have Vex instead of Cav here and also the inequality direction in (11) is
reversed. To be more precise, statement of Theorem 3.16 of [18] in our notation translates
to
0 ≤ VB
(
Γ∅,1n (pS)
)
− Cav(−u(pS)) ≤ C√
n
.
Noting VA (Υ) = −VB (Υ) for any zero sum game Υ and Cav(−f) = −Vex(f) for any
function f transforms the above equation into (11). Also note that on the right hand side
of the analogue of (11) in [18] we have the term
∑
s∈S
√
pS(s)(1− pS(s)) which is upper
bounded by |S| and is absorbed into the constant C here.
Observe that the constant C in (11) is independent of pS, hence it implies uniform conver-
gence of the sequence V
(
Γ∅,1n (pS)
)
to its limit on pS.
In the following, we provide an intuitive sketch of the key ideas used to prove Theorem 1;
see [18] for a rigorous proof. Alice initially does not know anything about S. Bob knows S
and his actions may increase Alice’s information about S. Let us denote Alice’s information
about S at time stage i by the mutual information Ji = I(S;A[i−1]B[i−1]) for i ∈ [n]. The
sequence {Ji} satisfies the following properties: J1 = 0, Ji ≤ Ji+1 and Ji ∈ [0,H(S)].
Take some δ > 0. We say that an information jump occurs at stage i if Ji − Ji−1 ≥ δ.
Since Ji ∈ [0,H(S)], the number of jumps is at most the constant k = H(S)/δ. Let
I = {i ∈ [n] : Ji − Ji−1 ≤ δ}. Since k is a constant, |I| ≥ n − k. The payoff of Alice is its
average over time stages 1 to n and is dominated by the average of stages in I, i.e.,
1
n
n∑
i=1
gS(Ai, Bi) ≈ 1|I|
∑
i∈I
gS(Ai, Bi).
At time instances in i ∈ I, Bob’s strategy is essentially non-revealing in the sense that if
from Alice’s view, S has conditional pmf qi(s) = p(s|a[i−1]b[i−1]) at time stage i, we have
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that qi(s) ≈ qi+1(s). Then, the payoff that Alice can obtain at time stage i is that of a
non-revealing u(qi(s)). The average payoff over various realizations of a[i−1]b[i−1] is equal to∑
a[i−1]b[i−1]
p(a[i−1]b[i−1])u
(
p(s|a[i−1]b[i−1])
) ≥ Vex u(p)
as
∑
a[i−1]b[i−1]
p(a[i−1]b[i−1])p(s|a[i−1]b[i−1]) = p(s). This demonstrates that Alice’s payoff is
greater than or equal to Vex u(p), regardless of how Bob plays.
On the other hand, Bob has a strategy ensuring that Alice’s payoff does not exceed
Vex u(p). Assume that
Vex u(p) =
k∑
i=1
λiu(pi(s))
for some non-negative weights λi, i ∈ [k] adding up to one, and pmfs pi(s) satisfying∑
i
λipi(s) = p(s).
Let V be a random variable on alphabet set {1, 2, · · · , k} satisfying p(V = i) = λi. Rv V is
joint distributed with S as follows:
p(V = i, S = s) = λipi(s).
Bob can locally create V by passing S through a channel p(v|s). Bob’s strategy is then
as follows: he uses his actions in the first few instances of the game to communicate V to
Alice. The payoff in these first few instances of the game do not affect the overall payoff
over the n games. By doing this, Bob is effectively announcing V to Alice, at no effective
cost. Bob then proceeds as follows: he completely forgets the exact state S and only given
the variable V , he plays the optimal strategy of u(pi) when V = i. In this case, since the
marginal distribution of S is pi and Alice knows whatever Bob knows about the state, the
posterior of the state does not change from stage to stage from Alice’s point of view,i.e., she
does not learn further about the state from Bob’s actions than the initial announcement V .
Hence,
E
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
gS(Ai, Bi)
]
=
k∑
i=1
λi
1
n
n∑
j=1
E [gS(Aj , Bj)|V = i] ≤
k∑
i=1
λiu(pi) = Vex u(p) .
Roughly speaking, this argument shows that the optimal strategy for the informed player
is to announce whatever the uninformed player is eventually going to learn about the state
at the beginning of the game and forget the extra information, so that both players end
up having a balanced information about the state. This completes the sketch of the proof
of [18].
An interesting implication of Theorem 1 is as follows: considering the mixed Nash
strategies, Alice’s mixed strategy ensures learning and exploiting from Bob’s actions about
state S in an optimal way, for all possible strategies of Bob. In other words, it implies
existence of a “universal” algorithm for Alice that performs as if Alice knew Bob’s strategy.
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Alice
Bob
s = 0 U D
R -1 0
L 0 0
Alice
Bob
s = 1 U D
R 0 0
L 0 -1
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Bob
U D
R -p 0
L 0 -(1-p)
Figure 3: (Top) payoff tables for Alice in state s ∈ {0, 1}. (Bottom) the average table.
4 Guaranteeing with High Probability
In this section we find the values of vssup and v
w
sup. Without loss of generality, we assume
that pS(s), pSA(sA) > 0 for all s ∈ S, sA ∈ SA, where SA = TA(S). Therefore T −1A (sA) :=
{s ∈ S : TA(s) = sA} is non-empty for all sA. Our main result is the following:
Theorem 2. We have
vs
sup
(pS ,TA,TB) = v
w
sup
(pS ,TA,TB) = min
sA
min
pS :Supp(pS)⊆T
−1
A (sA)
u(S) . (12)
Example 1. Consider the game tables given in Figure 3 where the numbers in the table
are Alice’s payoff. Assume that Bob knows the exact value of S, while Alice has no side
information about S. The average table is also given in the figure. One can easily obtain
u(p) = −p(1 − p) ( [18, Sec. 3.2.5.]). Since u(·) is convex, the maximum value that Alice
can guarantee in expected value is −p(1− p). However, since Alice has no side information,
we get
vssup = v
w
sup = minp
u(p) = −1
4
,
which is strictly less than the expected value case unless p = 1/2. A naive approach
suggests that perhaps it is more beneficial for Bob to play U if s = 0, and play D if
s = 1. However, note that in this case, Alice after observing Bob’s actions realizes the
true state and plays L for s = 0, and R for s = 1. While if Bob chooses each column with
probability 1/2 independent of the state (which is a completely non–revealing strategy), then
Alice does not gain any information about the true state and should choose one row with
probability half (since she does not know where the −1 is located). This would guaruntee
her a payoff of −1/4 in high probability. On the other hand, for the expected payoff regime,
the optimal average payoff of Alice is Vex u(p) = u(p), and this is obtained by Bob playing
the equilibrium strategy of the average table without using his knowledge of the state.
Before getting into the proof of this theorem in Section 4.1, we prove a few lemmas.
Our first observation is that the values of vwsup and v
s
sup depend only on the support of p(s).
Lemma 1. Assume pS and p˜S are two distributions on S such that SupppS = Supp p˜S.
Then we have
vs
sup
(pS ,TA,TB) = v
s
sup
(p˜S ,TA,TB),
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vw
sup
(pS ,TA,TB) = v
w
sup
(p˜S ,TA,TB).
Proof. Note that P (σn < v) =
∑
s pS(s)P (σn < n|s). Therefore, if P (σn < v) < ǫ, then we
have
P (σn < v|s) < ǫ
pmin
, ∀s ∈ S, (13)
where pmin 6= 0 is the minimum value of p(s) on its support. Then, we have
Pp˜ [σn < v] =
∑
s
p˜(s)P (σn < v|s) ≤
∑
s
p˜(s)
ǫ
pmin
=
ǫ
pmin
, (14)
which could be made small enough by setting ǫ sufficiently small.
Remark 2. As a result of this lemma, for a subset S ′ ⊆ S we may use vw
sup
(S ′,TA,TB)
and vs
sup
(S ′,TA,TB) as the value of vwsup(qS ,TA,TB) and vssup(qS,TA,TB), respectively, for
any distribution qS with Supp qS = S ′. In fact, vwsup(S ′,TA,TB) and vssup(S ′,TA,TB) could
be interpreted as values that Alice can guarantee “for each possible state in S ′” in the worst
case regime.
In the following lemma, we reduce the problem of finding vwsup and vsup to the case where
Alice has zero side information about the game state and Bob exactly knows its value. We
use the notations ∅ and 1 from the previous section.
Lemma 2. We have
vw
sup
(S,TA,TB) = min
sA
vw
sup
(T −1A (sA), ∅,1), (15)
vs
sup
(S,TA,TB) = min
sA
vs
sup
(T −1A (sA), ∅,1). (16)
Proof. We first show that
vwsup(S,TA,TB) = vwsup(S,TA,1) (17)
and similarly for vssup. In other words, v
w
sup does not depend on TB and from Alice’s
perspective, it is always as if Bob knows the state perfectly. To show this, consider the
following strategy for Bob: he guesses the state S randomly and proceeds assuming that
his guess is the correct value for S. Since the state space is finite, with a nonzero and
constant probability his guess becomes true. But since Alice should guarantee with high
probability, she can not neglect the constant probability of Bob’s guess becoming true.
Therefore, her strategy should be for the worst case, guaranteeing her payoff conditioned
on the event that Bob’s guess about the state is correct. This completes the proof for
vwsup(S,TA,TB) = vwsup(S,TA,1).
It remains to show that
vwsup(S,TA,1) = minsA v
w
sup(T
−1
A (sA), ∅,1),
and similarly for vssup. When Alice receives a side information sA, any of the states in the
set T −1A (sA) may have happened. Since Alice has no further initial side information other
than sA, we can assume that state space is reduced to T
−1
A (sA) with Alice having zero side
information. Then, vwsup(T
−1
A (sA), ∅,1) would be the payoff that can be guaranteed in this
case. Since Alice should guarantee for any possible value of sA, the maximum payoff she
can guarantee is minsA v
w
sup(T
−1
A (sA), ∅,1).
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4.1 Proof of Theorem 2
By Lemma 2, we only need to show that
vssup(S, ∅,1) = vwsup(S, ∅,1) = minpS u(pS) . (18)
Since vssup ≤ vwsup, it suffices to show the following two propositions:
Proposition 1. We have
vs
sup
(S, ∅,1) ≥ min
pS
u(pS) . (19)
Proposition 2. We have
vw
sup
(S, ∅,1) ≤ min
pS
u(pS) , (20)
To prove the above propositions, we first show a lemma:
Lemma 3. We have
vs
sup
(S, ∅,1) ≥ V (Ωn(S)) = min
p(s)
V
(
Γ∅,1n (p)
)
, ∀n ∈ N (21)
where Ωn(S) is an auxiliary zero–sum game in which Bob chooses state s (the table gs)
from the set S once and for all, and Alice receives no side information, and then each
player observes the history of the game (expect that Alice does not observe Bob’s action on
choosing the table). The game is played for n stages. The final payoff of Alice is the average
of her payoff in the n subgames, according to the payoff table gs with s chosen by Bob in
his first action.
Proof of Lemma 3. Note that Ωn(S) is a repeated zero–sum game with perfect recall, so
using Kuhn’s Theorem, we may consider behavioral strategies in a Nash equilibrium of this
game.
Assume v = V (Ωn(S)) is the value of Ωn(S) and α˜ be an equilibrium strategy for Alice.
This means that for all strategy β˜ for Bob, the expected value of Alice by playing α˜ is at
least v.
Now, we repeat game Ωn(S), m times. Hence, we have a game of size mn with m blocks
of length n. At the beginning of each block, a new value for s (a new payoff table) is chosen
by Bob and the game of length n is played. We call the state of block i as Si and actions
of this block by ai[n] and b
i
[n] for Alice and Bob, respectively. Here a
i
j for i ∈ [m], j ∈ [n] is
the j-th action of Alice in the block i.
Assume Alice plays strategy α˜ in an i.i.d. fashion in each block, which means that she
plays action aij at block i with probability
α
(
aij |a[i−1][n] ai[j−1]b
[i−1]
[n] b
i
[j−1]
)
= α˜
(
aij |ai[j−1]bi[j−1]
)
. (22)
Now we claim that playing this strategy by Alice results in guaranteeing v − ǫ with high
probability for her whenm is large enough. For doing so, assume that Bob plays an arbitrary
strategy in the game with length mn. More precisely he chooses state si for block i with
probability
β
(
si|s[i−1]a[i−1][n] b
[i−1]
[n]
)
, (23)
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and action bij with probability
β
(
bij|s[i]a[i−1][n] ai[j−1]b
[i−1]
[n] b
i
[j−1]
)
. (24)
Now define the random variable Wk to be
Wk =
k∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
gSi(A
i
j , B
i
j)− nkv, (25)
which is the sum of the payoffs of Alice in the first k blocks, centered by the expected payoff.
Now we claim that Wk is submartingale with respect to A
[k]
[n], B
[k]
[n], S[k]. Note that
E
[
Wk+1
∣∣∣∣A[k][n], B[k][n], S[k]
]
=Wk + E

 n∑
j=1
gSk+1(A
k+1
j , B
k+1
j )
∣∣∣∣∣A[k][n], B[k][n], S[k]

− nv. (26)
Now we claim that
E

 n∑
j=1
gSk+1(A
k+1
j , B
k+1
j )
∣∣∣∣∣A[k][n], B[k][n], S[k]

 ≥ nv. (27)
It suffices to show that for any realization of the history, s[k], a
[k]
[n]b
[k]
[n], the expected value
is at least nv. To show this, note that for this specific realization of the history, the term
inside the expectation is the sum of Alice’s payoff in a game Ωn where Alice uses equilibrium
strategy α˜ and Bob uses strategy
β˜(sk+1) = β
(
sk+1
∣∣∣∣s[k]a[k][n]b[k][n]
)
, (28)
and
β˜(bk+1j |sk+1, ak+1[j−1]bk+1[j−1]) = β
(
bk+1j
∣∣∣∣s[k+1]a[k][n]ak+1[j−1]b[k][n]bk+1[j−1]
)
. (29)
Since α˜ is an equilibrium strategy, for all strategy of Bob including the above β˜ in block
k + 1 the expected value of Alice’s payoff is at least the value of the game. Hence
E

 n∑
j=1
gSk+1(A
k+1
j , B
k+1
j )
∣∣∣∣∣a[k][n], b[k][n], s[k]

 ≥ nv ∀a[k][n], b[k][n], s[k]. (30)
Therefore
E

 n∑
j=1
gSk+1(A
k+1
j , B
k+1
j )
∣∣∣∣∣A[k][n], B[k][n], S[k]

 ≥ nv, (31)
Substituting this into (26) shows that Wk is a submartingale.
Note that
|Wk+1 −Wk| = |
n∑
j=1
gSk+1(A
k+1
j , B
k+1
j )− nv| ≤ 2nM, (32)
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where M is an upper bound on payoffs. Now using Azuma’s inequality with W0 = 0 we
have
P (Wm < −t) ≤ exp
( −t2
2m(2Mn)2
)
. (33)
Setting t = mδ for a 1/2 < δ < 1, the above bound goes to zero with m going to infinity.
Therefore for m large enough, with high probability we have Wm ≥ −mδ or equivalently
m∑
k=1
n∑
j=1
gSk(A
k
j , B
k
j ) ≥ nmv −mδ, (34)
or
1
nm
m∑
k=1
n∑
j=1
gSk(A
k
j , B
k
j ) ≥ v −
mδ−1
n
≥ v − ǫ, (35)
where the last inequality holds with high probability for m large enough. Therefore, Alice
can guarantee payoff v with high probability for the game with the game Ωn repeated m
times by playing α˜ i.i.d.
Next, observe that playing the same strategy by Alice can guarantee her payoff v − ǫ
for game Ωnm for large enough m. The reason is that Bob’s strategies in Ωnm is a subset
of Bob’s strategies in the m repetition of Ωn, as in the former Bob chooses s once at the
beginning while in the latter, he is allowed to choose it at the beginning of each of the m
blocks. Finally, observe that Alice can guarantee payoffs arbitrarily close to v for game Ωk,
as long as k is large enough, even when k is not of the product form nm for some m. Let
k = mn+ r for some 0 ≤ r < n. Alice can play the above good strategy in stages 1 through
mn and plays arbitrarily in stage mn + 1 through nm + r. Then Alice’s gain in Ωnm+r
would be with high probability at least
mn
mn+ r
(v − ǫ)− rM
mn+ r
, (36)
where M is an upper bound on the gains. The above value is greater than v − 2ǫ for m
large enough.
To sum this up, we have shown that there is a strategy for Alice (namely, i.i.d. α˜) that
guarantees payoff v for Alice, regardless of Bob’s strategy. This implies that
vssup ≥ v = V (Ωn) . (37)
which is the first part of our claim in equation (21).
Now using minimax expression for the Nash equilibrium we have
V (Ωn) = min
β˜
max
α˜
1
n
n∑
i=1
E [gS(Ai, Bi)]
= min
q(s)
min
β(bi|s,a[i−1],b[i−1])
max
α(ai|a[i−1],b[i−1])
1
n
n∑
i=1
E [gS(Ai, Bi)]
= min
q(s)
V
(
Γ∅,1n (q(s))
)
,
(38)
15
where in the second equality we have split Bob’s (behavioral) strategy β˜ into two parts:
first choosing the state, and then playing actions based on the chosen state and history of
the game. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 1. We have,
vssup(S, ∅,1)
(a)
≥ min
p(s)
V
(
Γ∅,1n (p)
)
(b)
≥ min
p(s)
(
Vex u(p)− C√
n
)
(c)
≥
(
min
p(s)
Vex u(p)
)
− C√
n
(d)
=
(
min
p(s)
u(p)
)
− C√
n
,
where (a) uses Proposition 3 (which holds for all values of n), (b) uses Theorem 1, (c) uses
the fact that the constant C is independent of p and (d) uses the fact that the minimum of
the convex hull of the function is the same as the minimum of the function itself.
Since this holds for all values of n, the result is proved simply by sending n to infinity.
Proof of Proposition 2. From equation (17), we have that
vwsup(S, ∅,1) = vwsup(S, ∅, ∅). (39)
For any distribution p(s), using Lemma 1 and Remark 2, we have vwsup(S, ∅, ∅) ≤ vwsup(p(s), ∅, ∅),
since Suppp ⊂ S. Now we claim that vwsup(p, ∅, ∅) ≤ u(p). In order to do so, assume v is
a value that Alice can weakly guarantee when the state is generated from distribution p,
TA = ∅ and TB = ∅. Therefore, due to the definition, for any ǫ > 0, with n large enough,
for any strategy βn for Bob in Γ
∅,∅
n (p), there exists an strategy αn for Alice such that
P (σn < v) < ǫ. Assume Bob plays the equilibrium strategy of u(p), iid in n games. Then
since initially neither Alice nor Bob have any side information about the state, they do not
gain any extra information by observing each other’s strategies. Now, looking at the game
at stage k, since Bob is playing his equilibrium strategy, E [gS(Ak, Bk)] ≤ u(p). Hence,
E [σn] = E
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
gS(Ai, Bi)
]
≤ u(p) .
On the other hand, P (σn < v) < ǫ implies E [σn] ≥ v(1 − ǫ). This together with the
above inequality we have v(1 − ǫ) ≤ u(p). Since ǫ was arbitrary, v ≤ u(p) and thus
vwsup(S, ∅, ∅) ≤ u(p). Since p was arbitrary, by taking minimum over p we get
vwsup(S, ∅, ∅) ≤ min
p(s)
u(p) .
Substituting this into (39) finishes the proof.
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5 An application
In this section, we provide an application of the high probability framework. This section
assumes a background in information theory. Consider an AVC channel with a legitimate
sender/receiver and also an adversary. Assume that the channel has a state S which is
partially known to the encoder/decoder and the adversary (imperfect CSI). Communication
channel is a conditional probability distribution p(y|x, a, s) where x is the encoder’s input
on the channel, a is adversary’s input on the channel, s is the channel state and y is the
output at the decoder. We assume that X,Y,A and S take values in finite sets X ,Y,A and
S, respectively. We assume that the state S is chosen from a distribution pS . Encoder and
decoder both have the same side information SX about S, while the adversary has a side
information SA about it. We assume that the channel state is chosen once and for all and
remains unchanged during the consecutive uses of the channel (slow fading). However, we
assume that the channel noise in p(y|x, a, s) is independent in different channel uses, i.e.,
p(y[n]|x[n], a[n], s) =
∏n
i=1 p(yi|xi, ai, s). Furthermore, as before without loss of generality
we assume that SX and SA are functions of S, i.e., SX = TX(S) and SA = TA(S). We
assume that p(sX) > 0 for all sX .
Adversary observes the history of the game at any stage i, i.e., inputs put on the channel
by the encoder X[i−1]. Likewise, we assume that both the encoder and decoder observe
adversary’s input on the channel A[i−1]. Therefore, this is a communication problem with
feedback.
We assume that encoder and decoder have access to unlimited private shared random-
ness, unknown to the adversary, allowing them to use randomized algorithms. A (n, 2nR)
code consists of strategies for encoding as well as strategies for decoding. The encoder
wants to reliably send a message M in {1, . . . , 2nR} via n uses of the channel, while the
adversary wants to prevent this from happening. More specifically, at stage i, the encoder
creates input Xi using the message M , its side information SX , its shared randomness K,
as well as X[i−1], A[i−1] previous transmissions by himself and the adversary. Therefore the
encoder’s strategy is to assign a probability to each symbol in X given the history of the
game. Hence, α(xi|x[i−1], a[i−1], sX ,m, k) which is the encoding strategy, determines the
probability of encoder generating. Adversary has also a strategy, which we denote by the
conditional pmf β(ai|x[i−1], a[i−1], sA, kA) where kA denotes private randomness of adver-
sary; it determines the probability of choosing ai as the input of the adversary, the history
of the game and adversary’s side information.
At the decoder side, we find an Mˆ given SX , Y[n], A[n],K; thus we are assuming that
receiver observes Y[n] as well as adversary’s inputs to the channel. The side information
at the decoder is assumed to be SX which is the same as the one at the encoder. A
rate R is called achievable if for ǫ > 0, there is some N0 such that for any n > N0, we
can design encoding / decoding strategies such that independent of adversary’s strategy,
the probability of error, i.e., P
(
M 6= Mˆ
)
is smaller than ǫ. The supremum over all the
achievable rates is called the capacity of the channel and is denoted by C. Our goal is to
find C. Figure 4 depicts our channel model. Following the common assumption in the game
theory literature, we assume that both encoder/decoder and adversary know each other’s
strategies. As in a repeated game with incomplete information, there is a tradeoff for both
encoder and adversary to use or hide their side information about the channel state.
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p(y|x, a, s)
Y1
Yn
...
...
Xi Yi
Encoder Decoder
M Mˆ
Adversary
Ai
SXSX
A[i−1] A[n]
X[i−1] SA
Shared Randomness K
Figure 4: A compound AVC channel.
Theorem 3. For the Compound-AVC problem described above, the capacity is
C = min
sX
min
pS :Supp(pS)⊆T
−1
X (sX)
min
p(a)
max
p(x)
I(X;Y A|S), (40)
where p(x, y, a, s) = p(s)p(a)p(x)p(y|a, s, x).
The mutual information is between the input X, and (Y,A) which are observed by the
receiver. Observe that the expression does not depend on SA.
5.1 Converse
For proving the converse, assume that the adversary puts its inputs i.i.d., from an input
distribution p(a) independent of all its observations and its side information about the state.
Then for a fixed value of state s, we have a point to point channel with input X and output
Y A. The encoder receives the side information SX = sX ; no further information about S is
revealed to him during the transmission, since adversary’s input is independent of the state.
Therefore, with the observation SX = sX at the encoder and decoder, we have a classical
memoryless compound channel with input X, output Y A and state S with the conditional
pmf p(s|SX = s). The capacity of this compound channel is [16, Theorem 7.1]
max
p(x)
min
s:TX(s)=sX
I(X;Y A|S = s). (41)
Therefore
R ≤ max
p(x)
min
s:TX(s)=sX
I(X;Y A|S = s)
= max
p(x)
min
pS :Supp(pS)⊆T
−1
X (sX)
I(X;Y A|S)
(a)
= min
pS :Supp(pS)⊆T
−1
X (sX)
max
p(x)
I(X;Y A|S)
(42)
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where (a) results from the minimax theorem and the fact that I(X;Y A|S) is concave in
p(x) and convex in p(s). Since the above holds for all sX and also for all p(s),
R ≤ min
p(a)
min
sX
min
pS :Supp(pS)⊆T
−1
X (sX)
max
p(x)
I(X;Y A|S), (43)
since p(SX = sX) > 0 for all sX . This completes the proof of the converse.
5.2 Achievability
5.2.1 An auxiliary game
Before specifying the encoder and decoder, we define an auxiliary repeated game with
incomplete information as follows: take P to be a finite subset of the probability simplex
∆(X ) over the input alphabet X . The game has two players: encoder/decoder (which we
call encoder for the sake of simplicity) and adversary. The action set of encoder is P and the
action set of adversary is A. The one stage game has |S| tables for each state of the channel.
In payoff table corresponding to s ∈ S, when encoder chooses action π ∈ P and adversary
chooses action a ∈ A, payoff I(X;Y |S = s,A = a) for p(x, y|s, a) = π(x)p(y|x, s, a) is
assigned to the encoder (and its negative is assigned to the adversary). In the following,
instead of writing I(X;Y |s, a), we use I(π;Y |s, a) in order to emphasize the dependence on
π. Then this game is repeated n times, and the total payoff function of encoder would be
the sum of its individual payoffs from the n games. Further, we assume that the encoder
and adversary receive SX and SA as their side information at the beginning of the game.
We call this game Γn.
5.2.2 From the auxiliary game to the compound-AVC problem
Assume that vssup is the maximum value encoder can guarantee with high probability in
the auxiliary game Γn. We claim that any rate R < v
s
sup is achievable for the original
compound-AVC problem. Take some R˜ such that R < R˜ < vssup. Assume the strategy
of encoder for strongly guaranteeing R˜ is pE. Thus, pE(πi|sX , a[i−1], π[i−1]) denotes the
probability the encoder chooses distribution πi at stage i given his observations up to that
time. Adopting pE, the gain of the encoder in Γn is at least R˜ with high probability when
n is large enough.
Codebook generation: A codebook of 2nR codewords of length n can be illustrated
by a table of size 2nR×n where row index indicates the message and columns indicate time
steps. Encoder and decoder dynamically construct the 2nR × n table, column by column,
during the transmission process by running the auxiliary game in parallel. In other words,
the column i of the codebook (which is needed to make the i-th transmission) is created after
time step i−1 as follows: the symbols in the i-th column of the codebook table are generated
independently from distribution πi of the auxiliary game (i.e., 2
nR i.i.d. samples from πi
are generated and put in the i-th column of the table). Note that since encoder and decoder
have infinite shared randomness, they can use their shared randomness to simultaneously
generate the codebook (i.e., the randomness needed to draw samples from n i.i.d. samples
from πi comes from the shared randomness between the encoder and decoder). The encoder
and decoder are synchronized as the decoder observes a[i−1] and knows SX .
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Encoding: Having message m, the encoder sends the symbols from the m-th row of
the codebook table that is being dynamically constructed during the transmission process.
To write down the joint pmf that this encoding strategy implies, let pA denote adversary’s
strategy in the compound-AVC problem, i.e., let pA(ai|sA, a[i−1], x[i−1], kA) be the proba-
bility that adversary chooses ai at stage i where xi is encoder’s input on the channel at
stage i and kA is adversary’s private randomness. Then, the joint distribution of variables
in the problem when the state of the channel is s and the message m is
p(sX , sA|s)p(kA)
n∏
i=1
pE(πi|sX , π[i−1], a[i−1])pA(ai|sA, a[i−1], x[i−1](m), kA)
×

2nR∏
j=1
πi(xi(j))

 p(yi|xi(m), s, ai)
Decoding: The decoder has access to a[n], y[n]. Also note that πi is generated from the
strategy pE , SX , π[i−1] and a[i−1] which are all known to the decoder. Also as was mentioned
above, since we use random strategies in the repeated game, πi is a random function of the
observations. However, since encoder and decoder have access to shared randomness, they
can use it to come up with the same πi and apply the strategy simultaneously. Also since
encoder and decoder have shared randomness, the decoder knows the codebook. For π and
a in finite sets P and A respectively, define τ(π, a) to be the set of indexes 1 ≤ i ≤ n where
encoder’s distribution is π and adversary’s input is a, i.e.,
τ(π, a) := {1 ≤ i ≤ n : Πi = π,Ai = a}. (44)
Then in the decoder, assume the sequence y[n] is received. The receiver declares that message
mˆ has been sent if
(xτ(π,a)(mˆ), yτ(π,a)) ∈ T npi,aǫ (X,Y |a, s) ∀π, a : nπ,a ≥ n3/4 for some s ∈ Sˆ(π[n], a[n]),
(45)
where nπ,a = |τ(π, a)| is the number of indexes i where Πi = π and Ai = a; the set
T npi,aǫ (X,Y |a, s) includes jointly typical sequences from X and Y of length nπ,a according
to p(x, y|a, s) = π(x)p(y|x, a, s); and finally
Sˆ(π[n], a[n]) =
{
s ∈ S : 1
n
n∑
i=1
I(πi;Y |ai, s) ≥ R˜
}
, (46)
Analysis of Error: Because the codebook is constructed symmetrically, without loss
of generality we assume that M = 1. We have two types of errors, the first one denoted by
E1 happens when mˆ = 1 does not satisfy (45) and E2 happens when for some mˆ 6= 1, (45)
is satisfied.
For analyzing the first error, assume that S = s∗ has happened. First note that since
encoder’s strategy guarantees R˜, we have
P
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
I(Πi;Y |Ai, S) ≥ R˜
)
≥ 1− ǫ, (47)
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and hence P
(
S ∈ Sˆ(Π[n], A[n])
)
≥ 1− ǫ. So we can assume that s∗ ∈ Sˆ(π[n], a[n]). Hence, in
order to show that mˆ = 1 satisfies (45), we shall show that with high probability
(Xτ(π,a)(1), Yτ(π,a)) ∈ T npi,aǫ (X,Y |a, s∗), ∀π, a : nπ,a ≥ n3/4, (48)
In the above expression s∗ is the real state of the channel and s∗X and s
∗
A be the side
informations. Iin the remaining we condition everything on S = s∗ and at times, we do not
state this explicitly in our expressions for the sake of simplicity. Note that since adversary’s
input at stage i, Ai is dependent on X[i−1], then we can not say that Xτ(π,a) are i.i.d.
from distribution π. For instance, if Ai = Xi−1, then conditioned on our observations on
adversary, the distribution on input is changed. Hence, we can not employ standard LLN
type argument to show that the first error type vanishes. Instead, define
Wi = Ni(a, π, x, y) −Ni(a, π)π(x)p(y|x, a, s∗) 1 ≤ i ≤ n, (49)
where
Ni(a, π, x, y) = |{j ≤ i : Aj = a,Πj = π,Xj = x, Yj = y}|, (50)
is the number of times a, π, x, y has happened up to stage i. Note that in the above definition,
a, π, x, y are fixed values and not random quantities. Similarly
Ni(a, π) = |{j ≤ i : Aj = a,Πj = π}|. (51)
Also define W0 = 0. Now we claim that Wi is a martingale with respect to H[i] :=
A[i]Π[i]X[i]Y[i]KA which is the history of the events up to stage i. To see that note,
E
[
Wi+1|H[i]
]
=Wi + E
[
1 [Ai+1 = a,Πi+1 = π,Xi+1 = x, Yi+1 = y]
∣∣H[i]]
− E [1 [Ai+1 = a,Πi+1 = π] π(x)p(y|x, a, s∗)∣∣H[i]]
=Wi + p
A(a|s∗A, A[i],X[i],KA)pE(π|s∗X , A[i],Π[i])π(x)p(y|x, a, s∗)
− π(x)p(y|x, a, s∗)pA(a|s∗A, A[i],X[i],KA)pE(π|s∗X , A[i],Π[i])
=Wi,
(52)
where in the second equality we have used the fact that the expected value of an indicator
function is the probability of its corresponding event. Hence, as was claimed, Wi is a
martingale. Also note that
|Wi+1 −Wi| =
∣∣∣1 [Ai = a,Πi = π,Xi = x, Yi = y]− 1 [Ai = a,Πi = π]π(x)p(y|a, x, s)∣∣∣ ≤ 1.
(53)
Therefore using Azuma’s inequality for t = n3/4ǫ, we have
P
(
|Wn| ≥ n3/4ǫ
)
≤ 2 exp
(
−n
3/2ǫ2
2n
)
, (54)
which goes to zero as n goes to infinity. Hence, for n large enough with high probability we
have
|Nn(a, π, x, y) −Nn(a, π)π(x)p(y|x, a, s)| ≤ n3/4ǫ, (55)
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This statement is true for all a, π, x, y which form a finite set. Therefore, we can take n large
enough so that the above expression is true wit high probability for all values of a, π, x, y.
Now, if Nn(π, a) ≥ n3/4 we have∣∣∣∣Nn(a, π, x, y)Nn(a, π) − π(x)p(y|x, a, s)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ n3/4ǫNn(a, π) ≤ ǫ, (56)
which shows that (48) is satisfied and the first type error vanishes as n goes to infinity.
Now we analyze the second type of error. We condition the second error on Π[n] = π[n]
and A[n] = a[n], Y[n] = y[n]. Define E2(mˆ) for mˆ to be the event where mˆ satisfies (45).
Note that since the adversary does not observe X[n](mˆ) for mˆ ≥ 1, unlike the first type of
error, it can not establish correlation between them. Thus, conditioned on π[n], X[n](mˆ)
are independent and Xi(mˆ) is generated from πi. Therefore for s ∈ Sˆ(π[n], a[n]), we can use
packing lemma [16, Lemma 3.1]. Using the independence among blocks τ(π, a), for some
π, a where nπ,a ≥ n3/4 we have
P
(
(Xτ(π,a), Yτ(π,a)) ∈ T npi,aǫ (X,Y |a, s)
) ≤ 2−npi,a(I(π,Y |a,s)−δ(ǫ)), (57)
for some δ(ǫ) that converges to zero as ǫ converges to zero. Now using the independence of
the above events, we have
− log P
(
(Xτ(π,a), Yτ(π,a)) ∈ T npi,aǫ (X,Y |a, s) ∀π, a : nπ,a ≥ n3/4
)
≥
∑
π,a:npi,a≥n3/4
nπ,a(I(π;Y |a, s)− δ(ǫ)).
Now since the mutual information is bounded and the terms corresponding to those πi, ai
that do not appear in the above expression have length less than n3/4, and the set of possible
π, a is finite, there is a bounded constant M¯ such that∑
π,a:npi,a≥n3/4
nπ,a(I(π;Y |a, s)− δ(ǫ)) ≥
∑
i
I(πi;Y |ai, s)− nδ(ǫ)− M¯n3/4
≥ n(R˜− δ(ǫ)− M¯n−1/4),
(58)
where the last inequality uses the assumption s ∈ Sˆ(π[n], a[n]). Therefore using union bound
P (E2) ≤ 2nR2−n(R˜−δ(ǫ)−M¯n−1/4) = 2−n(R˜−R−δ(ǫ)−M¯n−1/4), (59)
the above value goes to zero as n goes to infinity by appropriate choice of ǫ since R˜ > R.
Hence we have proved that any rate below vssup is achievable.
5.2.3 Computing vs
sup
for the auxiliary game
In the rest of the proof, we use Theorem 2 to find the value of vssup. We need to first find
u(p), which is the game value for the average payoff table
∑
s p(s)I(π;Y |a, s). Thus,
u(p) = min
p(a)
max
π∈P
∑
s
p(s)p(a)I(π;Y |a, s). (60)
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Writing X instead of its distribution π for convenience we have
u(p(s)) = min
p(a)
max
p(x)∈P
I(X;Y |AS), (61)
where the joint distribution of the variables is p(s)p(x)p(a)p(y|x, a, s). Since X,A and S
are independent, we have
u(p(s)) = min
p(a)
max
p(x)∈P
I(X;Y A|S). (62)
Using Theorem 2, we have
vssup = minsA
min
pS :Supp(pS)⊆T
−1
A (sA)
min
p(a)
max
p(x)∈P
I(X;Y A|S). (63)
In the above argument, the set P is a finite and arbitrary subset of distributions on X .
Now the only thing which remains to show is that by appropriate choice of finite set P we
can get arbitrarily close to the target value in (40). In order to do so, define function f as
f(p(x), p(a), p(s)) = I(X;Y A|S), (64)
where the joint distribution is p(s)p(x)p(a)p(y|xas). This function is continuous on the
product of compact spaces which is compact itself. Therefore, f is uniformly continuous.
Hence, since the set of distributions on X is compact, for every given, ǫ > 0, there is a
finite covering P of ∆(X ) where for all p(x) ∈ ∆(X ), there exists p˜(x) ∈ P such that for all
p(s), p(a)
|f(p(s), p(x), p(a)) − f(p(s), p˜(x), p(a))| ≤ ǫ. (65)
Therefore by appropriate choice of finite set P we can get within any ǫ to the target value
in (40).
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